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ABSTRACT: After the wars against Atjeh (1873-1907) finished, Dutch rule over the Dutch East India was total. The Dutch East Indies 
Red Cross (DEIRC) awaited a new task, preparing to give aid in the case of a foreign invasion. The problem was that the end of the 
wars against the autochthonous “rebellions” also meant the end of Red Cross visibility and in the minds of many, the end to Red 
Cross urgency. Aid in wars against a real opponent is from a point of public relations much more important than the preparation of 
aid against an unknown opponent. “Work in times of peace” had to be the answer to this problem, but this work was only in name, 
and not de facto different from preparation of aid in times of war. Through “peace work” the DEIRC prepared itself for the war-task. 
To be able to fulfil the war-task the Red Cross had to have enough doctors, nurses, and stretcher-bearers. Visible peace-work had 
to provide for that. It enlarged the Red Cross’ popularity and trained its volunteers. However, at the beginning of 1942, when the 
Japanese invaded the Dutch East Indies, it turned out to be too little, too late.
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SOBRE LAS “TAREAS DE GUERRA” Y EL “TRABAJO DE PAZ”. LA CRUZ ROJA DE LAS INDIAS ORIENTALES 
HOLANDESAS ENTRE LAS GUERRAS COLONIALES Y LA SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL
RESUMEN: Tras el fin de las guerras contra Aceh (1873-1907), el dominio holandés sobre la India Oriental Holandesa fue total. La 
Cruz Roja de las Indias Orientales Holandesas (DEIRC) quedaba a la espera de una nueva tarea: prepararse para proporcionar ayuda 
en caso de una invasión extranjera. El problema era que el final de las guerras contra las “rebeliones” autóctonas también significaba 
el fin de la visibilidad de la Cruz Roja y, a juicio de muchos, el final de la perentoriedad de la Cruz Roja. El socorro en guerras contra 
un adversario real era desde el punto de vista de las relaciones públicas mucho más importante que los preparativos de socorro 
contra un enemigo desconocido. El “trabajo en tiempo de paz” debía ser la respuesta a este problema, si bien resultó diferente solo 
de palabra, no de hecho, en relación a los preparativos de socorro en tiempo de guerra. A través del “trabajo en tiempo de paz”, la 
DEIRC se preparó para las tareas relacionadas con la guerra. Para poder cumplir este último objetivo, la Cruz Roja debía conseguir 
suficientes médicos, enfermeras y camilleros. Las tareas visibles en tiempo de paz debían suministrarlos. Ello amplió la popularidad 
de la Cruz Roja y formó a sus voluntarios. Sin embargo, a comienzos de 1942, cuando el ejército japonés invadió las Indias Orientales 
Holandesas, todo resultó demasiado poco y demasiado tarde.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Cruz Roja; colonialismo; ayuda humanitaria; Indias Orientales Holandesas; Primera Guerra Mundial; Periodo de 
Entreguerras.




One of the first rules of the Dutch East-Indies Red 
Cross (DEIRC) –set up in 1870, three years after its 
mother organisation in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
Red Cross (DRC)– was that it in case of war or other 
threats to the Dutch East Indies possessions, as they 
were called, it would contact the chiefs of the depart-
ments of War and Navy forces to see what it could do 
“to fulfil the needs of the Dutch land and sea forces”.1 
Even theoretically there was no mention whatsoever 
of aid to sick or wounded adversaries. This of course 
can –and nowadays mostly will– be seen as contradic-
tory to the Red Cross spirit, but it was anything but 
contradicting the statutory rules of the International 
Red Cross of 1863, or the Geneva Convention of 1864. 
The laws of war did not apply to colonial warfare but 
only to violent disagreements between members 
of the so-called civilised countries, that is: Europe, 
America, Turkey and, from the end of the 19th cen-
tury, Japan, after it had proved itself militarily superior 
to China (Best, 1983, p. 20). And indeed, the DEIRC 
was never reprimanded by the Geneva Committee of 
the Red Cross for neglecting aid to wounded autoch-
thonous warriors. On the contrary, according to the 
DRC-board, primus inter pares of these authorities, 
Gustave Moynier, offered not only the Dutch society, 
but also its overseas department all help imaginable.2
One would think that discrepancies like these be-
tween the (imagined) spirit and letter of an organisa-
tion, would trigger historical research, but that has 
hardly been the case. The more or less official Red 
Cross history, the works of Pierre Boissier (1985) and 
André Durand (1978), do not mention Red Cross ac-
tivities in wars of (de)colonisation. In the voluminous 
work of Caroline Moorehead (1998), there are some 
pages on the British Red Cross, hardly worth mention-
ing, on its work during the Boer War 1899-1902, but 
none for instance on British India. Even the critical 
work of John F. Hutchinson (1996) neglects colonial 
Red Cross action, and this goes for the work of Dieter 
Riesenberger (1992), or the recent bundle of articles 
by Wolfgang Eckart and Philipp Osten (2011) as well.
However, this last omission was coincidental be-
cause Eckart, in his huge Medizin und Kolonialimperi-
alismus (Medicine and colonial imperialism), is one of 
the few who have paid attention to Red Cross work in 
a colonial context.3
Furthermore, with the exception of two English ar-
ticles and one Dutch book (Van Bergen, 1992, 2004, 
2013), literature on the Dutch East Indies Red Cross is 
more or less absent. The articles focus on the Aceh-
wars (1870-1907) and the war of de-colonisation 
(1945-1949). In the article below I will focus on the 
time of relative peace in between and especially on 
the relationship between war tasks and peace work.
DECREASING INTEREST IN RED CROSS WORK
At the suggestion of the conservative Minister of 
War, J.A. van den Bosch, the DRC was established by 
Royal decree in 1867, by the equally conservative, 
militaristic king William III - nicknamed King Gorilla 
and not (solely) because of his looks4. Partly because 
of this aristocratic, conservative, militaristic footprint, 
the DRC encountered a huge problem in the years of 
peace between the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1871) 
and the Boer war (1899-1902), a war that was closely 
followed in the Netherlands because of the originally 
partly Dutch Boers. In fact: one of the ambulances sent 
there by the DRC was arrested and confiscated by the 
British, which became one of the reasons why a new 
Geneva Convention, declared in 1906, was thought to 
be necessary (Aan de Stegge, Van Bergen, 2013).
What was this problem? During the Franco-Prussian 
war and again during the Boer war, the Red Cross am-
bulances attracted a great deal of attention. Atten-
tion causes popularity which in turn brings members. 
Shortly before the Boer war, however, the DRC had 
almost ceased to exist. In fact, around 1890 it consist-
ed solely of a few small local branches and the main 
council at The Hague.
Due to its own regulations, which only provided aid 
to wounded and sick soldiers in time of war, in the 
years between these wars, the Society for the Lend-
ing of Aid to Sick and Wounded Combatants in Times 
of War, as the DRC in those days was officially called, 
had been all but invisible and invisibility automatically 
leads to loss of popularity and members. The main 
board had long resisted the obvious answer to this 
problem, work in times of peace, but around 1900 
came to admit that there was no real alternative. If 
the Red Cross ceased to exist it would of course never 
be able to fulfill its commitments: assisting the Dutch 
military health service, the MHS, in a war in which the 
Netherlands were involved, or sending ambulances to 
foreign battlefields if this was not the case. However 
grudgingly at the beginning, it soon embraced the ad-
vantages work in peacetime would give, as well as rec-
ognising the growth of membership and volunteers. 
For, although this never was officially admitted, this 
“peace work”, as it was called, was nothing more than 
a training exercise for work in times of war.
THE DUTCH EAST-INDIES RED CROSS
The DEIRC was founded in 1870 officially as a local 
branch of the DRC, but of course, due to the distance 
from the Motherland and the vast size of the terri-
tory, with rather more independence and autonomy 
than local branches in the Netherlands themselves. As 
was the case with the DRC, its members were largely 
recruited from upper, conservative classes. Military 
health officers were common and women played al-
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most no part, certainly not in the decision making. 
Although some small military expeditions had already 
taken place in which the DEIRC had assisted, the real 
job began when in 1873 the first of three Aceh wars 
broke out; in fact three periods of heavy fighting in 
one long war from 1873 up until 1907.
However, when in 1907 it was declared that the 
whole of the Archipelago was part of the Dutch Em-
pire –although it would never be completely quiet in 
Aceh– the DEIRC would face the same problem as the 
mother organisation had had in the decades before. 
Without war, no activity. Without activity, no visibility. 
Without visibility, loss of popularity and membership. 
But the organization had one advantage. The DRC had 
already pointed to a way out of all this misery.
THE GREAT WAR
Between the expedition to Flores in 1907 and the 
First World War there was no military activity and 
therefore no Red Cross activity worth mentioning.5 It 
was the Great War that directed attention to a some-
what forgotten goal of the colonial Red Cross organi-
sation: preparation for its wartime task in the case of 
foreign rather than domestic hostility.6 “Somewhat 
forgotten” because already in 1912 there had been 
some debate on the possibility of military conflict 
with another country in the region. Japan, by the way, 
was not among the usual suspects, who were all Eu-
ropean. Although Japan had just militarily put the Chi-
nese and Russian in their place, it was not until the 
nineteen thirties that non-colonised Asian countries 
could be considered to pose a threat as well.7
In this debate, the Minister of War T.B. Pleyte point-
ed out that transport and nursing units, the so called 
“kolonnes”, were of the utmost value. They had to 
make sure that the Red Cross could take care of the 
sick and wounded in the rear, because in the case of a 
war with a European adversary the Dutch East Indian 
MHS would never be able to do its job completely on 
its own.8 This meant the Red Cross had to be totally 
reorganised, because, according to Pleyte, as it was, 
the organisation was incapable of fulfilling such a job. 
To support this reorganisation, for the first time in its 
history the DEIRC received government funding.9 Set-
ting up new local departments especially increased 
Pleyte’s enthusiasm. They were of the highest inter-
est to “spare the organisation decay and deterioration 
and give it the extra personnel and materials needed 
for fulfilling its wartime job”.
 But this could only lead to success if “already in 
peacetime it was prepared for and designed accord-
ing to what in wartime, in a short period of time, had 
to be done by government and civilians”.10
Pleyte was right. To fulfil such a job the DEIRC was 
much too frail. In fact, it consisted of no more than 
the 11 persons forming the Batavian main board.11 Re-
organisation therefore was indeed indispensable, also 
because it could no longer distract itself from work in 
peacetime; work which by then was being carried out 
not only by the DRC, but by almost all national Red 
Cross organisations. Nevertheless it would take more 
than two decades before it really got off the ground, 
leaving aside the work done in some polyclinics which 
determined its work in the nineteen twenties.
EARLY “PEACE WORK”
However, some work was certainly done. To get the 
peace work started and to simplify the creation of 
new departments, the governors of the different parts 
of Dutch East India were asked to take steps in that 
direction personally.12 The goal of the DEIRC was re-
phrased into dedicating itself in times of peace to so-
cial work which would increase interest in the organi-
sation, and in times of war assisting the MHS in the 
form of nursing and further transport of the wounded 
brought behind the lines by the MHS “especially those 
of our own country”.13 Although a telling remark, this 
also was somewhat superfluous because the wound-
ed transported back by the MHS would already have 
been “especially those of our own country”. Again, this 
rephrasing meant nothing more than that the peace-
time work was mainly considered important because 
it would deliver the number of personnel needed to 
satisfactorily fulfil the wartime task.14
Indeed, several new departments were set up, but 
to the taste of the main board, they were frequently 
over-enthusiastic in fulfilling their social tasks, how-
ever important for the war task.15 An attempt to solve 
this problem, by creating transport and nursing units 
partly independent of the local departments, and re-
quired to mainly practise together with army units, 
was too much to ask of almost all departments. It 
completely failed. It was considered too complicated 
and too expensive.16
Actually, to undertake the reorganisation, the DEIRC 
had to wait for approval by the DRC of its new rules 
and regulations, for officially it was still the mother or-
ganisation. Although in hindsight it probably would not 
have mattered much, luckily for the DEIRC it had not 
done so for this approval had not arrived before 1920, 
which had everything to do with a complete reorgani-
sation of the DRC itself during World War I (Van Bergen, 
1994, pp. 226-256). The main point of this reorganisa-
tion was that, what was in practice, an already existing 
subordination of the Dutch Red Cross to the MHS, was 
made official, in fact stripping the organisation of every 
claim to neutrality and independence, although it natu-
rally rejected such criticism. But it is no surprise that in 
World War I the DRC did not send ambulances to the 
battlefields of Verdun, Somme and Ypres. Every man, 
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woman and piece of material had to stay within Dutch 
borders until it was absolutely certain the Dutch army 
would not get involved in the fighting. And this certain-
ly was not reached before a truce had been signed (Van 
Bergen, 1994, p. 210; Van Bergen, in print).
According to the Dutch main board this reorganisa-
tion was on a par with the wanted development of the 
DEIRC.17 New in the rules and regulations of this latter 
organisation was article 10:
The central committee promotes as much as possible 
that in peacetime everything is done to prepare all 
departments and sub-departments for what is asked 
of them in the case of war or uprising.18
As the word “uprising” indicates, the new task 
would not endanger the old one, which was assisting 
the Royal Dutch East Indian Army if it had to suppress 
autochthonous resistance to Dutch rule.19
In spite of all this, the First World War and the 
above mentioned reorganisation only resulted in a 
short revival. As had been the case between 1907 
and 1914, between 1922 and 1932 the history of the 
Dutch East Indian Red Cross was again written mainly 
in Batavia and Buitenzorg, and it was no coincidence 
that they were the two places with Red Cross poly-
clinics. The only other activity was financially sup-
porting other Red Cross organisations, but this too 
was drastically reduced after a short period, because 
of the economic crisis.20
CONSERVATISM VERSUS PEACE WORK
Another reason for this limited activity however, is 
that until the nineteen twenties the Batavian board 
kept insisting on a highly conservative interpretation 
of peacetime work, although aiding healthy military 
men –as the DEIRC did for instance by providing to-
bacco or even a billiard table if asked for– also con-
tradicted the letter of the rules and regulations. This 
conservatism is already demonstrated in the repri-
mand the all too enthusiastic sub-departments had 
received. The Red Cross had to restrict itself to aid in 
times of war and preparation for this task in times of 
peace. Anything else was out of order.
An early example, typical of this attitude, was the 
ambulance for aid in the Transvaal during the Boer 
War. It was established by a ladies committee at Se-
marang, especially set up for the occasion, but with 
the support of the local Red Cross branch. However, 
every request to Batavia to also support this ambu-
lance was rejected as “contradicting the goals of the 
organisation”,21 although sending ambulances to for-
eign battlefields was the raison d’être of the Red Cross 
in general, and part of the rules and regulations of the 
Dutch mother organisation. The ambulance went any-
way, and in spite of its opposition, the central com-
mittee in later years presented it as an example of the 
noble deeds the DEIRC had done over time.22
This continued concentration on the wartime task 
led to an even stranger situation one decade later. It 
prevented the Dutch East Indian Red Cross from giv-
ing aid during the plague epidemic which raged in the 
Dutch East Indies from 1911 onwards. So the DRC felt 
obliged to send an ambulance all the way from the 
Netherlands;23 an act of medical care seen by most 
Europeans in the archipelago as a total waste of mon-
ey, for the plague was thought not to endanger the 
European, but only the autochthonous inhabitants.24 
Just as the First World War had caused the DRC to se-
riously look at preparation of the wartime task in case 
of foreign hostility, so it was probably this inexplicable 
situation that led to the conviction that some adjust-
ments in the rules and regulations had to be made, 
making room for peace work. But as said, it neverthe-
less would take another twenty years before this re-
ally would get off the ground.
AID IN TIMES OF PEACE
The year was 1932 when finally the DEIRC seriously 
undertook some attempts to broaden its field of work, 
to aid in situations not directly linked to wartime 
preparation. This in spite of the fact that since 1922 
–even as a separate organisation, although officially 
still a DRC-department– it had already been a mem-
ber of the Paris-based League of Red Cross organisa-
tions, an organisation primarily directed at aid during 
natural disasters or epidemics. This was in contrast to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross in Gene-
va, which continued to focus on aid during war. At the 
same time it was concluded that the preparation for 
wartime tasks in the case of a foreign attack, needed 
a new and powerful impulse. It became particularly 
clear when Japan invaded Manchuria, although neu-
trality did not permit this to be made explicit.
According to the Red Cross historian H. Bakker, this 
meant that the real Red Cross spirit in the Dutch East 
Indies had finally awakened. And his colleague J.W.F.A. 
van den Berg de Bruyn stated consensually that the 
time of “sweet composure” had ended.25 In any case it 
had a major positive effect on membership. Soon the 
number had reached 6000, spread over no less than 
32 local departments.
 Of those members in 1937 1,000 had done their 
first aid-exam, with another 1,000 studying.26 What 
triggered this change in comparison with the rigid 
policies in the years around World War I? Or better: 
was it really a change? Not particularly. Preparation 
of the wartime task was and remained the underly-
ing reasoning, only it had finally dawned upon the 
DEIRC, about thirty years after its mother organisa-
tion, that for this broadly interpreted peacetime work 
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had proven to be the perfect instrument. But that the 
peacetime work had to be in the service of wartime 
preparation was explicitly written into the new rules 
and regulations, which were approved in 1939.27
The nineteen thirties peacetime work was regarded 
as being quite the opposite of the social work of the 
nineteen twenties in polyclinics. It had to remain per-
fectly clear that the social work was a means and not 
a goal in itself, as the work in the polyclinics had been. 
For this could only hinder the second most important 
task of every Red Cross organisation: preparing in times 
of peace for the aid to sick and wounded soldiers dur-
ing war. This could hardly be called social work, but it 
certainly was an important part of the nineteen thir-
ties peace work description. This also explains why the 
sheer fact of putting together new transport units –by 
far the most important executors of the wartime task– 
was considered to be peace work. But all this had little 
to do with work on behalf of peace. Peace work was 
work in times of peace, explicitly or implicitly directed 
at the task expected from the Red Cross in times of war.
PEACE WORK, WARTIME TASKS AND PROPAGANDA
Of course propaganda said different. Probably un-
der the influence of the critique of radical Dutch 
peace organisations, who accused the Red Cross, 
and certainly the national Red Cross, of being noth-
ing more than a militaristic organisation in sheep’s 
clothing, in the nineteen thirties disaster aid was ac-
centuated, followed by the words “war included”. War 
therefore was considered to be a disaster, a more or 
less natural phenomenon, rather than a man-made 
display of enormous violence. The wartime task was 
pushed into the background and imbedded in the Red 
Cross work as a whole.28 At the request of the central 
committee the actual primary task was presented as a 
mere side show or even completely left out, because 
this could harm the Red Cross popularity.29
It was not before a DEIRC-Conference in 1938, that a 
plea was made to put the wartime task up front again, 
also in the propaganda, although this still had to be 
done with some caution. The pacifist critique had 
worn off, and the thunderclouds of war were begin-
ning to appear on the horizon. To quote health officer 
and member of the central committee J. Th. Wilkens:
We now have to prepare ourselves, there is no other 
way possible, for the support we have to give to the 
MHS when war comes. The public –and here some 
tact must be used– which will come to the aid of the 
Red Cross, must be fully alive to the fact that at this 
moment it will do so first and foremost in the service 
of the Red Cross wartime task; it is forbidden to devi-
ate from this point of view.30
Furthermore a few months before the confer-
ence, Wilkens had already written that peace work 
and war work were not necessarily incompatible. On 
the contrary, Red Cross work in times of war eased 
the suffering and therefore was in fact peace work 
as well. He therefore in one stroke defined all Red 
Cross work as peace work, even as work on behalf 
of peace. For every bit of Red Cross work during war 
was a step towards peace.
In a certain way the wartime task of the Red Cross 
has been somewhat snowed under in propaganda. It 
is about time to set matters right. A war propaganda 
can never be distilled from this and certainly not in our 
Dutch and Dutch East Indies community, for there only 
the necessity of retaining our neutrality, our independ-
ence, could be the cause of war. One would rather 
not dwell upon the possibility that the misery of war 
could strike us as well, and one is afraid, that, if the 
Red Cross merely points at this possibility, the public 
will turn away from us. But if, somewhere in the future, 
our army, no: our entire population, is exposed to the 
disasters of war, then it must be absolutely impossible 
that the Red Cross would fail to fulfil its wartime duties. 
Everyone who admits this can, fully imbued with its 
peace ideal, propagate the war work of the Red Cross.31
PLANNING PEACE WORK AND WAR TASKS
From the middle of the nineteen thirties the plans 
for preparation of the work during wartime, in which 
now also according to the Red Cross employees, Ja-
pan would be the most likely adversary, were made 
in abundance. The above mentioned conference was 
already the second dedicated to the subject. In both 
planning and at the conferences peacetime work was 
praised because it was deemed necessary as wartime 
preparation. In one of these plans, already written in 
1934, it could be read that peacetime work was use-
ful, but wartime work had to remain up front.32 And 
even the slight distinction between the two would 
soon disappear. In a speech of Van den Berg de Bruyn 
held only one year later, it was said that the transport 
units could do their job because they had been “pre-
pared through peace work”.33
All in all it is no wonder the first statement to be 
discussed during the 1938 conference was:
The inescapable extension of the war task of the Red 
Cross will only be possible if as intensively as possi-
ble, sympathy for the Red Cross can be aroused; the 
development of the peace task can widely awaken 
the interest in the Red Cross and therefore contrib-
ute largely in building an organisation more power-
ful and productive.34
Only a widely popular organisation could be a con-
stant factor in society and only then could prepara-
tion for its main task be possible. Practice had shown 
“that peace work had become the essential element 
in making the Red Cross ready to really take prepara-
tion for its wartime job into its own hands”.35
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It was also no wonder that one of the common fac-
tors in all the plans presented was that peace work 
had to be expanded, not in its own right, but pre-
cisely because it was of use for the wartime task. And 
a second common factor was that Red Cross work 
was more than an act of voluntary humanitarianism. 
Red Cross work was an act of national interest, mak-
ing it, in a war against a foreign foe, a national duty 
comparable with fighting in the army. Surprise was 
frequently expressed at the fact that the society was 
imbued with the importance of an army, but not of a 
well functioning national Red Cross society.36
RED CROSS AND MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE 
What was meant when talking of a “well-function-
ing Red Cross society”? As had been the case during 
the Aceh wars, a well functioning Red Cross meant a 
Red Cross working completely according to the wishes 
of the MHS, of which it would be a mere extension. 
Different from what had occurred in the Aceh wars, 
however, it was said that the task of the Red Cross had 
to be complementary because –as Pleyte had already 
said twenty years before– it was impossible for the 
MHS to take the entire care for the sick and wounded 
on its shoulders. To make this complementary work 
possible, civilian hospitals had to be requisitioned and 
Red Cross personnel had to be subordinate to military 
personnel, under the military rules of discipline and 
punishment. That the Red Cross was supposed to be a 
cheap extension is proven by the remark that an MHS 
fully prepared, would simply be too expensive.37 And 
this, by the way, is exactly why in the 1860s so many 
governments and military authorities had embraced 
Dunant’s Red Cross idea. It provided the answer to the 
widespread call for a better care of wounded soldiers, 
without being too much of a financial burden.
But this was all theory. The problem was that even 
after the growth of the Red Cross there were simply not 
enough men and women to staff the necessary trans-
port and nursing units, as there were not enough doc-
tors to fulfil the medical tasks. And it was highly uncer-
tain that there would be within a reasonable time span. 
Nevertheless the central committee kept on demand-
ing that the “wishes uttered from military side” would 
be met, also when in 1939 it turned out that it would 
be impossible to fulfil even the minimal demands.38
For instance, on 1 September 1938 there were 269 
aid workers registered, of the almost 1000 who were 
thought to be essential. The lowest estimate of physi-
cians thought to be necessary, was by far not met. The 
DEIRC, so the conclusion had to be, was quite unready 
to fulfil its task if war should come. Wilkens tried to 
explain how it had come to this disastrous situation 
and concluded that Dutch East Indian society simply 
was not ready for the Red Cross ideals of:
grand, international aid everywhere where there 
is suffering, irrespective of individual, nationality, 
race or religion. To really understand the Red Cross 
ideals demands a certain international culture, an 
environment with a certain spirituality deeply em-
bedded in the entire population. Although living to-
gether in a most harmonious way, our Indian soci-
ety exists of extremely different races and peoples. 
It is therefore not a unity that can be seized by one 
common ideal. We must not forget that especially 
the indigenous character is completely strange to 
the international ideals the Red Cross propagates. 
Of course, the native community is largely built 
on helping and assisting each other; but this aid 
confines itself to family and village. A sense of as-
sistance to the entire human race is completely 
strange to the native.39
As well as the lack of acceptance on a psychologi-
cal level, neither were the autochthonous inhabitants 
very inclined to do any practical work.
In comparison with the Western community, the na-
tive one, only to a far lesser degree, sees the neces-
sity of anticipation, of preparation, of what possibly 
is going to happen in a future far, far away. Nature, 
which delivers everything necessary for the here and 
now, and fatalism, part of the Eastern character, cause 
it not to concern itself with days yet to come.40
This, by the way, was exactly the same criticism 
Westerners had received sixty years before if they 
were considered not anxious enough to embrace the 
Red Cross ideal and organisation. But in the nineteen 
thirties in the Dutch East Indies, practical European 
disinterest in the Red Cross needs another explana-
tion. Although psychologically and spiritually totally 
prepared to engage in this fine work, the Europeans 
in the Archipelago lacked:
a character of national or local patriotism. Here, one 
is inclined to engage in work for the good of a resi-
dence in which one often stays only temporarily, to a 
much lesser degree. But also towards the Empire, the 
urge, which in the Netherlands causes many to vol-
untarily join an organisation on which in times of war 
one can depend, is lacking. The sense of responsibility 
towards the nation is felt much less by Europeans in 
the Indies than is the case in the Motherland.41
In taking this stand, Wilkens could explain the lack 
of voluntary Red Cross personnel in the Dutch East 
Indies with the help of what is seen as one of the 
great Red Cross paradoxes: a neutral, international 
ideal executed by national organisations working 
in close contact with anything but neutral military 
health services. The autochthonous inhabitants were 
too fatalistic to get any work done and did not think 
internationally enough to comprehend the ideal, 
and the European inhabitants did not care enough 
for temporary house and hearth to get involved in 
the ideals practical translation. It must be said, by 
Asclepio, 66 (1), enero-junio 2014, p031. ISSN-L: 0210-4466. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/asclepio.2014.05
ON “WAR TASK” AND “PEACE WORK”. THE DUTCH EAST INDIES RED CROSS BETWEEN THE COLONIAL WARS AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
7
the way, that Wilkens was a bit rosy on Red Cross 
cooperation in the Netherlands before World War 
II. Again mainly due to the fact that it recruited its 
board members primarily from conservative, aristo-
cratic circles, until the end of the Second World War, 
or even later, until February 1953 when parts of the 
provinces Zealand and South-Holland were flooded, 
it was not the people’s movement it is today.
To end this situation, in the whole of the Indies 
propaganda had to be used to make the population 
accept the ideal of the Red Cross and especially the 
work that followed from it. There was sympathy, judg-
ing by the donations regularly made, but the willing-
ness to translate sympathy into action, was missing. 
This was the reason Wilkens again put the wartime 
task up front in the propaganda, because for that 
specific task, financial support alone could and would 
never be enough.42 But peace work as well remained 
of the utmost importance. Not only out of its ongoing 
propagandistic value or because it delivered the train-
ing for the wartime task, but also because it was the 
foremost means to get the autochthonous population 
to assist as well.43
OBLIGATORY RED CROSS AID
Nevertheless, as time progressed and the possibility 
of war grew, it became clear that propaganda alone, 
would probably not do the job in time. There seemed 
to be only one way out of this problem, for which the 
mentioned subordination of Red Cross work to military 
wishes, provides a hint. This subordination not only 
raises questions about the humanitarian and neutral 
content of Red Cross aid, but also its voluntary char-
acter. “Force”, “duty” and “sanctions” became words 
heard more and more in Red Cross circles, because, 
so it was said, the army could not depend on such an 
uncertain factor as voluntary aid. The question as to 
how to raise enough personnel to staff transport and 
nursing units, who were also willing to accept military 
orders,44 was answered by pointing to the possibility 
of obligatory Red Cross work.
At the second conference, November 1938, the 
shortage of doctors and assistants especially, was 
brought to the fore, leading again to the necessity of 
forceful measures even though at the first conference 
of 1936 these had not been without criticism.45 An at-
tempt to get medical students involved in Red Cross 
work on a voluntary basis had failed entirely, so P. Pe-
verelli, head of the Batavian health service, pointed 
out a fine initiative of the Dutch Indies School of Physi-
cians. The students of the highest grades did take part 
in exercises of transport units, and this was not a coin-
cidence. In the report of his speech it is put as follows:
Force is executed. It is not left to the young them-
selves, they are not asked if this work maybe has their 
sympathy, or if they do not mind if their pair of white 
trousers gets dirty or wrinkled on the field, or if their 
nails get torn a bit. That’s the spirit and the speaker 
honours the director of the school who by so doing 
has promoted our task.46
Peverelli hoped directors of other medical schools 
would soon follow this example of force given, an ex-
ample that has to be seen in the light of conscription. 
Because of conscription armies existed of sons and 
husbands, who could not be denied the right to be 
well cared for when wounded or sick. Many were of 
the opinion that the right to receive care could only be 
met sufficiently if there was a duty to provide care.47
The problem of the autochthonous inhabitant’s 
unwillingness to participate also played its role in 
the difficulties in getting enough unit assistants. 
The course they had to follow was not easy and 
so a certain development was needed. This meant 
that “in present day circumstances mostly Euro-
peans had to be asked”. But they were frequently 
conscripted and many of the non-conscripts were 
required for civilian services.
This meant the Red Cross had to look for assistants 
among autochthonous and Chinese inhabitants too, 
but only amongst “the more intelligent ones” and 
even those would only be recruited for minor Red 
Cross positions.48 This proposition was supported by 
the physician Ch.W.F. Winckel, who some years ear-
lier had been part of the Ethiopia-ambulance of the 
DRC, during the Italian-Abyssinian war. He made a 
plea for the introduction of an extra ordinary, non-
combatant, Red Cross conscription for non-Europe-
ans who were a bit more “intellectual”, a word he 
himself provided with brackets. It was in line with a 
proposition of the central committee member Van 
der Werf that to get enough unit personnel, intro-
duction of forced labour was essential.49
A committee following the second conference 
studying the diverse resolutions accepted, reached 
the same conclusion. There was no way the neces-
sary number of doctors, nurses and assistants could 
be found only with the means available at that mo-
ment. History had shown that nothing could be ex-
pected if Red Cross work was to stay voluntary. The 
exact solution was still not clear, but the committee 
did know it could not come from the DEIRC itself, but 
had to come from the Dutch East Indies government. 
If the government could not or would not come up 
with a solution, the Red Cross could do nothing more 
than to let the government know that assisting the 
MHS would be impossible.50
The only way out seemed to be civil conscription, 
which was in fact introduced in 1940. The intention 
was “to select persons to fulfil activities indirectly 
concerning the countries’ defence, if not enough vol-
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unteers were available”.51 On this, in the middle of 
July 1939 Wilkens had already mentioned that the 
army “wanted to create a forced civil conscription or-
ganisation of certain officials who for the Red Cross 
itself were hard to get, and put them at Red Cross’ 
disposal”. J.A.J. Meijer, DEIRC-main board member, 
added that the army command thought that this 
could help the Red Cross in its hour of personnel 
need “without losing its voluntary character”. He was 
convinced that the Red Cross could get enough doc-
tors this way, because those doctors who refused Red 
Cross service could be “captured by means of this or-
ganisation set up by the army”.52
Nevertheless it remains questionable that even if 
civil conscription could solve the gigantic personnel 
problems of the Red Cross, if only because the wish 
to force autochthonous inhabitants into Red Cross 
service was being questioned, at a time when it was 
also being contested that there should be a separate 
autochthonous army. Perhaps that is why this point 
was handled with extreme care. Not everybody was a 
supporter of a substantial increase of autochthonous 
personnel in the Dutch East Indies army. Red Cross 
service could perhaps give supporters an extra argu-
ment in favour of their plea.
The question is if the words of Pleyte before World 
War I, i.e. that the Red Cross was anything but ready, 
were still valid at the time World War II came to 
the Archipelago. One might wonder, because of all 
the concentration on the war task of the Red Cross, 
through propaganda, force, or so called peace work. 
Besides, the 1950 account of all the work the Red 
Cross had done in the Indies from days of old stated 
that the DEIRC had been completely up to its task at 
the time Japan invaded.53 But this hardly can be fur-
ther from the truth. In spite of all the preparation, lit-
tle had changed, if only because of a lack of person-
nel. It, furthermore, is very much the question if it 
would have made any difference whether the DEIRC 
had been prepared or not. Probably this question has 
to be answered in the negative.
CONCLUSION
For the Dutch East Indies Red Cross the times 
between the three major wars fought in the Dutch 
East-Indies –the Aceh war 1873-1907, the Second 
World War (1942-1945) and the war of decoloni-
sation (1945-1949)– were times of little activity. 
The main reason for this was a conservative inter-
pretation of the statutory words “aid in times of 
war”. However, in the case of absence of war this 
means invisibility and therefore lack of popularity. 
Around and about World War I there was some de-
liberation on the obvious answer to this problem, 
work in times of peace, but the main board would 
not have it. For this it took until the nineteen thir-
ties before it finally started to work, too late to re-
ally make a difference in Red Cross strength before 
the Japanese invasion.
This Red Cross peace work, as it was called, was 
nothing more than preparatory work for the war task 
the organisation had to fulfil if war with a foreign ad-
versary was to come. In contrast with a war against 
“indigenous rebellions”, it was thought in such an 
event the military health service would not be up to 
its task on its own. This also was the reason for finally 
embracing peace work.
Without it there probably would not even be a 
Red Cross organisation anymore to assist the army’s 
physicians and nurses. So, although in propaganda it 
was often pictured otherwise, peace work and the 
war task were in fact one and the same, only differ-
ing in time: a time of peace and a time of war. Com-
pletely in agreement with the old line “if you want 
peace, prepare for war”, the Red Cross peace work 
was nothing more than a preparation for the task ex-
pected from the organisation in times of war.
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